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Abstract. This article describes some problems in fighting a war for the purpose of defending a political 
entity's credibility. 
 
Some political authorities of some North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nation-states, NATO 
civilian and military authorities, and politico-military analysts and commentators have advocated that 
NATO's credibility and that of its constituent members is on the line in the conflict with the Yugoslav and 
Serbian governments. If this credibility is found suspect, so the argument goes, the very existence of 
NATO and sizable amounts of its members' political power will be seriously threatened. What is this 
credibility that seemingly can have such impact? 
 
Credibility may denote that an entity means what it says. Yet, always meaning what one says is not 
necessarily a politico-military virtue--or so intimate the many classical studies on the utility of deception. 
Moreover, whether it means what it says or not, the resulting consequences for that entity may entail 
combinations of positive and negative features. In addition, the salient consequences for an entity may 
have little or nothing to do with whether it means what it says. 
 
Credibility also may denote that not only does an entity mean what it says but it will stick with this 
meaning. Besides the Issues raised above, however, is sticking with a meaning necessarily a politico-
military virtue? Information may disconfirm or not support an initial impression or contention. Events 
and their accompanying consequences can radically change essential parameters of an initial situation 
and context. Sticking with one's initial meaning under such circumstances can be fatal to maintaining 
security and power. 
 
Credibility has at least one other denotation--an entity's ongoing combination of ability and motivation 
to act in its own interests. It is here that an entity's viability may truly be on the line. However, an entity 
may become too caught up in ensuring that allies, neutrals, and adversaries alike perceive that it is 
credible--so caught up that the essence of this denotation of credibility is forsaken. For in the context of 
this third denotation, perception is not reality. The entity that engages in force--when force is otherwise 
not in its interest--purely to reinforce the perception that that entity is credible is expending resources 
detrimentally. In such a case, the entity is expending resources in a manner that underlines its 
inadequate credibility--or its own perception of a threat to its credibility that may be not shared by 
other perceivers--and that detracts from the resources that should remain unused until force becomes 
in its interests to employ. 
 
The "staying the course" rationale to wage war for credibility will most often credibly lead to straying off 
the credible course. (See Banzai, T. (1997). Effects of experts' comments on the causal and intentional 
attributions of newspaper readers. Japanese Journal of Social Psychology, 13, 53-63; Borg, M.J. (1997). 
The structure of social monitoring in the process of social control. Deviant Behavior, 18, 273-293; 
Engstrom, E. (1996). Audiences' perceptions of sources' credibility in a television interview setting. 
Percetual and Motor Skills, 83, 579-588; Fox, C.R., & Irwin, J.R. (1998). The role of context in the 
communication of uncertain beliefs. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 20, 57-70; Peters, R.G., 
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Covello, V.T., & McCallum, D.B. (1997). The determinants of trust and credibility in environmental risk 
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